

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

SPEECH OF WENDELL PHILLIPS, ESQ.
AT THE
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I shall venture to speak to you to-night on the Presidential Election.

Let me begin with some statements in which we all agree—statements touching the nature of the war, the motives which led to it, and the indispensable conditions of any durable peace.

This civil war is no accident—no chance jostling of little interests one against the other; its end as hard to guess as its beginning. On the contrary, it is the inevitable death grapple of ideas forever irreconcilable with each other. The struggle began when Freedom and Slavery were brought face to face in 1789 by the adoption of the Constitution. For seventy years the weapons were arguments and votes. In that arena every thoughtful man saw, four years ago, that slavery touched its downfall. Warned and made desperate by that defeat, Slavery appealed to arms. How long this military form of the struggle, this civil war, will last, no one can tell. How near its close will bring us to the end of the "irrepressible conflict," none can tell. This only every man can see, there will always be some form of struggle between the two foes, Slavery and Freedom, until one or the other gains a perfect and entire victory—until one supersedes the other wherever our flag floats. No one who believes in a just God can doubt which will in the end crush out and supersede the other. Every one knows that, in the nature of things,

"The eternal moon,
Incapable of stain, must expel
Her mischief, and purge off the baser fire,
Victorious."

But how and how soon? these are the questions. Will this war scourge from the continent the monster and all his brood? or shall it close, and leave the festering remains to poison and embitter our future for many a year? Who can tell?

But in this we are all agreed, it is the duty of every good citizen to do his utmost that the nation may reap the greatest possible advantage from this war. If it be possible to make it result in the immediate and entire abolition of the system of slavery among us, then we should strain every nerve to secure that result. All that the most advanced Republicans offer to-day is a constitutional prohibition of slavery throughout the Republic. Once I claimed more, and thought it might be wisely and hopefully struggled for. But that was before the nation had been debauched and betrayed by its leaders.

Such a peace, to be sure, would not be the end of the irrepressible conflict. No man, no nation, can be at peace while its conscience and life are at odds. Our institutions rest on the idea of perfect equality—every man equal before the law. Toward that goal, Toussaint has shown us that the whole race is tending by irresistible gravitation. Toward that goal, this nation struggles by definite and long-avowed purpose. There will never be rest till we reach it. There ought to be no rest till we reach it. But no matter whether this tendency be good or bad; that it exists and overhauls all opposition, no man will deny. Science must either prove the negro not a man, or politics must admit his equality in the army, at the ballot-box and the Senate floor. The South sought consistency in a bastard science: afraid, like Montesquieu, to allow that the negro was a man, lest the world should infer that they were not Christians; the North acknowledged the negro's manhood in theory, and trampled on it in fact. This inconsistency has poisoned her literature, her politics and her religion, for seventy years. It will continue to do so for seven hundred, if it shall exist so long. Until it ceases, real peace is impossible. I believe now, as I have always done, that there can be no real peace, no durable reconstruction of the Union, except based on the suffrage and equality of all men, without distinction of color.

Mr. Lincoln's model of reconstruction is the experiment in Louisiana, which puts all power into the hands of the unchanged white race, secured by direct, hating the laboring class, plotting constantly for aristocratic institutions. To reconstruct the rebel States on that model is only continuing the war in the Senate chamber after we have closed it in the field. Such reconstruction, leaving the South with its labor and capital at war, puts the whole payment of the debt on the industrious North, and in that way it will hang on us for half a century. Such reconstruction makes the freedom of the negro a sham, and perpetuates slavery under a softer name. Such reconstruction, leaving the seeds of discontent and division in the South in places of power, tempts and facilitates another rebellion, at the instigation or with the aid of French Mexico. Such reconstruction dooms us to a second or third-rate place among nations, and provokes foreign insult and aggression.

There is no plan of reconstruction possible within twenty years, unless we admit the black to citizenship and the ballot, and use him, with the white, as the basis of States. There is not in the rebel States sufficient loyal white basis to build upon. If we refuse this method, we must subdue the South, and hold it as territory until this generation of white men has passed away, and their sons, with other feelings, have taken their places, and Northern capital, energy and immigration have forced their way into the South. Should we adopt that plan, and wait for such changes, seventy years must elapse before we can venture to rebuild States. Meanwhile, a large and expensive army, and the use of despotic power by a government holding half its territory and citizens as subjects, make every thoughtful man tremble for the fate of free government. A quick and thorough reorganization of the States, on a democratic basis, every man and race equal before the law, is the only sure and speedy way to save the Union. I urge it not for the black man's sake alone; but for ours—the nation's sake.

Mr. Lincoln's offer of amnesty has been accepted by men with wealth in their hands and treason in their hearts all over West Virginia, Missouri, Tennessee and Louisiana. This is the class which has always hated the democratic tendency of the Union, and still hates it. This is the class which rebelled to break the Union, and their purpose is unchanged. Military defeat has not converted these men; the soreness of defeat is only added to the bitterness of their old hate. Make peace on the basis of that amnesty proclamation, and you increase the evil a thousand fold. These men, the moment our army returns, will wield those States against us, and while they crush the negro at home, will send to Washington the same conspirators to cripple the Union that they did before 1860. No theory of State Government can deny their full right to do so. Slavery out of the question, I should myself defend their clear right to use their power.

How shall we avert this? There was a time, in 1861 and 1862, when the Government, using its vast influence over a people roused to lofty heroisms, might by appropriate constitutional amendments have guaranteed the Union forever in the Southern States by basing it on the negro's irreducible love and need of it. At that time, if an Abolitionist or a statesman had been at the head of the nation, the sword of war might easily have cut this Gordian knot. Lack of knowledge, lack of vigor, lack of purpose, lack of loyalty in the highest sense of the word, on the part of the Government, has forfeited that God-given opportunity, and has brought us instead a united South and a divided North.

The only way open to us now is to call the poor whites of the South into political existence, and thus withstand this aristocratic anti-Union power which Mr. Lincoln has reestablished. Hitherto ignorant, poor and despised, they have been driven in herds to the ballot-box, as Mr. Davis, General Harding or John C. Calhoun directed. Northern skill, enterprise, business and wealth must invade and permeate

those States, developing intellect and thrift in this class, giving them something to defend, and intelligence and sense to defend it, and thus secure a Union element in Tennessee, for instance, to outweigh the marked treason which now governs those States. Of course, this is a long process, but it is the only one. In this struggle between Aristocracy and Democracy, Northern civilization, based on Democracy, must commend itself to the minds, plant itself in the hearts of these five millions, and we must create there that love of Union which God gave us ready made and indestructible in the negro's heart, and which we so madly flung away.

In this work of education, the Federal Government must lead the way. With its great power and vast patronage, it may command attention and buy support anywhere, in time. Said Cassius Clay to me, ten years ago, "Give me the patronage of the Government, and I will make Kentucky an Abolition State in ten years." To effect this, the Government must work with clean hands; the lesson must be plain and consistent; wherever it appears, the negro must be treated as a man; if he may not rise yet to the just level of a voter, his manhood must be sacred. Only by a true Democratic practice can the nation breed up this ally in the convictions and habits of the South. In this necessarily slow education of the poor whites, we need not only the example of consistent practice by the Federal Government, but we need also the weight of the non-voting four million blacks grappled to us by links stronger than steel—gratitude for justice and fair play. In any attempt to govern there by merely playing off one class against the other, we shall be beaten. Said a most sagacious Tennessee lawyer to me within a week—"Leave one square inch, one thread of the slave system, and the old slaveholders will rule us as before, and use us ever against the Union." Mr. Whalley, member of the House of Representatives from West Virginia, made a similar remark to the House in still more emphatic terms. State laws and customs will continue for years to crush the negro, while he has no ballot to defend himself; and this will keep alive class hatred, and poison State politics. But let the Federal Government, in all its branches, in every act, ignore the difference between white and black, be blind to color, and soon its preponderant influence will lift State habits to its own level, and make true democracy possible. This shows the kind of man and policy I deem indispensable the next four years—why I demand a President disposed and resolved to administer the government in this mood—which Mr. Lincoln has never done, either in the army or in civil affairs, even since his Proclamation of January, 1863.

You see I come round again to the corner-stone of justice and equal rights. I am an Abolitionist still as well as a citizen. The experience of thirty years assures me that no peace basis but one of justice to the negro is possible. I should discount it as infamous if it were possible. For twenty-five years I sought to break the Union in order to secure justice. I seek to save it now only for the same end—justice. I know as well as any man the value of a true nationality. No words can adequately describe it. But even a true nationality is nothing to me when weighed against justice. That sham nationality we have had—a herd of States kept together, as a great orator said, by partnership in hunting slaves—I detest. The same curse I once asked of God on the old Union, I shall pray for any new one which does not rest on absolute justice. War, war forever, oh God! until this nation acknowledges the manhood of the negro!

So much for the nature of the war and the conditions of any durable peace. One word now as to the motives which inspired the war. If you ask nine out of ten of the Republican editors and speakers in this country, "What are we fighting for?" they will reply, "For the Union—nothing more—nothing less—nothing else." This I believe is the idea which lights out of the gorgeous eloquence of Everett yesterday at Faneuil Hall. When I quote him for it, I can give it no more honorable endorsement; for, since 1861, few men have more honorable or enviable record than Edward Everett.

But with due deference let me say, this popular statement has only a homopoeitic proportion of truth—about truth enough to furnish a basis for a Congressional resolve. But it would never hold water under cross examination in any county court. What made the North, in 1861, resist the South's attack? Had that been the simple and only motive, the North would, in my opinion, have yielded, as she had done a score of times, and secured, on infamous conditions, an infamous Union. The North chose war instead of submission as the means to save the Union, in 1861, because she perceived that war would practically destroy slavery, and give the nation at the same time the right solemnly to abolish it. But for this motive, I do not believe the North would have ever accepted the Southern challenge. All our history shows this. Every man familiar with 1861 one inch below the surface has facts to prove it heated up and running over. The South, judging as she did, the usual submission from the North. But the Abolitionists, in thirty years of agitation, had lifted the people to a nobler level. You remember that struggle against what Macaulay calls "a sudden priest-craft and a raving crowd"—that hurricane which swept over us, tearing the seats to pieces, scattering parties in fragments and tearing up colossal reputations by the roots. In that storm, Webster's frigate foundered at dead of night, and Seward's dry keel bottom-side up and drifted.

Moulded by that long and faithful teaching, the masses clutched eagerly the opportunity to reconstruct the Union on an anti-slavery basis—one sure to last, and worthy to last. But for the Anti-Slavery agitation, the North would have had neither opinion nor purpose capable of joining battle with the South in defence of our idea of the Union. But for that agitation, the North would have submitted to have the Union either broken or remodelled, as South Carolina pleased.

And no matter what Jefferson Davis may say in his mad despair, we all know (witness Stephens and every confederate authority) that the South seeks independence only to save slavery.

Again, after years of war, Lincoln, on the 1st of January, 1863, summoned the negro to our aid, and pledged the nation's honor and power for his freedom. It is, therefore, no longer true, if it ever was, that we are fighting only for Union. No; as the President proclaimed, to the music of Niagara's thunder, we fight now for union and the liberty of the negro.

You see, therefore, that what we need as the basis of honorable peace is the real and substantial freedom of the negro, not its mere form; what we began war for, and what we have since solemnly pledged ourselves to, is that. Up to this point, with most of what I have said I suppose the larger portion of those I have the honor to address will agree. Here, if at all, our paths separate. You will say to me, grant it all; Mr. Lincoln acknowledges the manhood of the negro, and will use all the means of the nation to protect it. He announces Union and Liberty as the objects of the war. If I could believe in him, I like you, would accept his re-nomination, and deem his re-election a judicious act. But I judge him by his words and deeds, and holding him to that test, I dare not trust him with our future. [This announcement was received in marked silence, and created considerable attention. Several persons interrupted the speaker, inquiring as to whom he would trust, &c., to which, at the moment, he paid no attention.]

The military horizon is so bright that we may reasonably hope the next four years will see this war close, and the form and basis of reconstruction will test the honesty and statesmanship of the nation. The more brilliant and decisive our military success, the greater the danger of a false magnanimity in the hour of compromise. Such an hour is infinitely more critical than Antietam or Gettysburg. There, we may fully expect that, in the long run, victory will rest with the strongest battalions; and who

doubts which section is the stronger? But all his story shows us that, in making peace, the weakness and disloyalty of leaders have, in nine cases out of ten, led the people half they had fairly earned. I see nothing in Mr. Lincoln's past to encourage the hope that we shall be any exception to that rule. Every thing, on the contrary, confirms it. At such an hour, I have no faith in Abraham Lincoln.

Let me give you my reason for this distrust. But, first, let me allow that he is the only candidate in the field. As for that Confederate gunboat which anchored off Chicago, August 29th, and invited G. B. McClellan to be captain, my only wish is may she soon meet her Kearsarge, and join her sister pirate Alabama in the ocean's depths! And may her would-be captain not be so lucky as his brother Semmes! May he find no English swiftness to save him from the fate he deserves!

Again, let me say that any fact which I recall to your memory to-night, I do not recall in order to throw blame on Mr. Lincoln. I have neither time nor wish for recrimination. There is a well-known phrase, "Indemnity for the past, and security for the future." I ask no indemnity for the past. Let bygones be bygones. I only seek security for the future. I invite your attention to Mr. Lincoln's record only to judge his character and bias. American citizens, trusted at this critical hour with the future of our children, the fate of the negro, and the honor of Democratic institutions, we are bound to scrutinize carefully and anxiously the man to whom we are about to give a predominant, an almost omnipotent influence over the most momentous period of the nation's existence. I allow all his merits—remember all he has done. I am perfectly willing, here and now, for the purpose of this argument, to concede that he means the right, and has only misused it—intended the public good, but has only mistaken the way. Cardinal DeRetz says that "irresolute men often wish an end, but retreat at the necessary means." Let this explain Mr. Lincoln.

You will remind me that he pledged himself at Niagara to Union and the abolition of slavery. Granted. I will not say, what I really believe, that the pledge was wrung out of him by the pressure of the Cleveland movement, and is, in a very large degree, only an electioneering act. I will accept it without question. Let me remind you, in return, that of common wars, not one in ten ever gained all they at first demanded; and of civil wars, not one in four ever did so. Reconstruction, then, will be matter of bargain. In a bargain, neither party ever gets all he sets out with asking. We must expect, therefore, that when the bargain is made, one or the other of the two claims made at Niagara will be wholly or in part surrendered. This is inevitable. Mr. Lincoln's offer is Union and Abolition. On one or the other he must compromise. Which is it likely to be? If William Lloyd Garrison stood in the President's place, I should have no fears. I should feel that though he might yield on the question of Union, he would never surrender a hair's breadth on that of Liberty for all men. Can I put the same trust in Abraham Lincoln?

In the first place, remember he is a politician; not like Mr. Garrison, a reformer. Politicians are like the fore leg and shoulder of a horse—not an upright bone in the whole column. That which is not itself crooked, stands crooked. But for this the beast could not move. Reformers are Doric columns. Weight may crush them, but can neither bend nor break. But our politician, whose function is to bend, without let or hindrance, to which side, the Union side or the Abolition side? Look at his life and judge.

Bear in mind, while we examine it, that it was Slavery which struck at the nation's life; that the war was accepted to free the negro; and that the nation's necessity has forced it to link its fate with that of the negro. Now, then, observe how unduly tender the President has been toward the South; how unduly and dangerously reluctant he has been to punish the negro, or use his aid. Vigorous, despotic, decisive, every where else, he halts, hesitates, delays, to hurt the South or help the negro.

First, look at the policy of the war. At a Cabinet meeting, (or something equivalent to it,) held early in the summer of 1861, it was distinctly determined not to fight the South, not to hurt it, but only to array the North in force and strength, and wait for the effect, which it was thought would be conciliatory. We were to show the South what we could do, but not to do it, lest her pride be wounded and compromise rendered impossible. Mr. Blair was the only dissenter. He thought war should be carried on upon military not political principles, but was overruled. This policy continued for more than a year, and explains the dreary nightmare of McClellan. For fifteen weary months the President flung away the treasure of the North, and let her sons rot inactive. Raymond, of the *New York Times*, the President's most prominent champion, has written the history of the Administration, and devoted a chapter to McClellan. Read it,—accept every fact as stated,—and you will see that very defence shows the President wholly unfit for his place, provided his only object was to fight down the rebellion. Any man so conducting his own business would be bankrupt in a year, and deserve to be yet. We have Montgomery Blair's uncontradicted and reiterated affirmation, that for political reasons, the President "concerted," last August, to put McClellan at the head of an army. Mr. Lincoln himself told Congress, in July, 1861, that the Government's greatest perplexity was to avoid receiving troops faster than it could provide for them. "In a word, the people will save their Government, if the Government itself will only do its part *indifferently well*."

When 1864 opened on us with the Confederacy in such flush of strength and defiance, it seems to me it proved that Government had not done its duty even *indifferently well*. It is a foul libel on a generous nation and on Democratic institutions to say that the Administration did as much, militarily, as it might. It is a fouler libel still to say that it let the people forward to the adoption of measures as fast as public opinion would bear. Bear with me, fellow citizens, while I say that no nation ever loaded its Government down with such lavish treasure as we did. The world has seen no such fighting since Waterloo, if even then. Taking this into account, the war has been a failure compared with what it should have been. Notwithstanding bull-dog Grant, the old seakings Farragut and Dupont, the dash of Sheridan and Hooker, notwithstanding Sherman's cool persistency, more like an unyielding law of nature than a mere human will,—the blood of Sedgewick and Wadsworth,—Butler, the indefatigable, equal to every emergency,—and Fremont, statesman and soldier alike,—spite of all means and results weighed against each other, the war is a failure. A little knot of aristocrats, disconcerted by their own fellow citizens, standing on a volcano of four million slaves, presume to rebel against twenty million shrewd, brave, and roused men,—against the richest and most skillful people in the world,—and defeat them for four years! Is that success? Either Democratic institutions are a failure, or one of our men is—choose!

Who raised, as Monroe Conway says, "McClellan from a petty Western Copperhead into the colossal power which divides and affrights the nation? Who called back to life the Democratic party, killed by the wind of the cannon ball against Sumter? Abraham Lincoln's halting, half way course—neither hot nor cold—wanting to save the North without hurting the South. Mark you! this failure sprung from no want of brains, but want of purpose—of willingness to strike home.

Second. Mr. Lincoln does not lack vigor. He can be despotic when it suits him; yes, go up to, and beyond even, his war power of despotism, when he pleases. In these four years, he has been decisive and vigorous every where except on the slave question. This is another reason why I fear he will bend on this side when the final settlement is made.

Look at his despotism. I do not mean his neces-

sary, judicious, honorable despotism. Suppressing disloyal presses, sending traitors to Fort Warren, suspending *habeas corpus*, is legal, necessary, to his honor. I only wish Vallandigham had been sent to prison instead of across the lines, or stayed there.

But, on the 11th of last May, Arguelles, a Cuban, was seized in New York by order of the President, and secretly conveyed on board a vessel bound for Cuba. Several days passed before he was heard of. He knew what had become of him. The seizure was not made by virtue of any writ or order of any court, but on the simple order of the President. The State Department had been informed that Arguelles was guilty of trading in slaves. The reasons which made it a clear case of kidnapping (I mean no disrespect—that is the legal description of the offence) on the part of the President, are these: 1. It is the settled policy of our Government never to surrender criminals to any foreign power, unless where we are bound by treaty to do so. This is not only acknowledged to be the settled policy of our Government, but it was recognized as the general law of nations, both in Westminster Hall and the House of Peers, so late as 1842, in the *Croft* case. 2. The Executive cannot arrest or detain under a treaty, unless Congress by statute has directed the method. 3. Our Government must be furnished with such evidence of the person's guilt as would justify his commitment for trial. We have no treaty with Spain, and of course no law of Congress to execute one. No title of evidence against Arguelles was offered our Government. You have just seen the method of surrendering Muller, the London murderer; openly, in face of day; means, and time, and counsel given him for defence, and to scrutinize the charges against him. Arguelles, unaccused, in any legal sense, is stealthily kidnapped in the early morning, and without one friend being informed, without one moment given him to explain or defend himself, is consigned to a foreign dungeon. Mr. Seward confesses that the act was an exception to the whole course of our history. You all know that the Constitution gives this President no right to arrest any man. Congress has given him no right to arrest one situated like Arguelles. Of course the plea of military necessity has no place in this case. It is a warlike, needless act of usurpation and despotism on the part of the President. Napoleon committed no greater offence against national law when he sent the kidnapped Deputies to Cayenne. The U. S. Senate knows all this as well as we do, and postponed the case to December for fear of ruin to the Republican party in this canvass.

3. Gen. Frank Blair commands now a corps of the U. S. army, by the President's order, without any commission. He had held a commission as major general. To serve Mr. Lincoln's political purposes, he allowed Gen. Blair to resign his office, take a seat in the House of Representatives, and speak and vote there, and then resume his place in the army. His commission he could not give him back. That was gone forever, since the Constitution provides (Art. I, Sect. 6.) "No person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either House (of Congress) during his continuance in office." The first act that Blair did in the House of Representatives, after placing his resignation in Lincoln's hands, vacated his generalship. He could not be major general again without the Senate's concurrence, which the President well knew Mr. Blair would never have. Hence he sent him to command a corps without a commission. The Senate submitted in silence. Louis Napoleon did nothing worse, in principle, on the 2d of December, 1851. The sham French Senate of Peers has since done nothing more shameful than this sycophancy of our Senate. For whom was this despotism vented? For Frank Blair, whose intrigues have thus far held Missouri from being a free State; whose sole purpose in entering the House was to insult Chase, the only anti-slavery member of the Cabinet; and who, from 1862 to the present moment, has omitted no opportunity to belch forth his colonization bigotry in the most insulting terms he could select. For Frank Blair, whose brother, a member of the Cabinet, poisoned our New England air in 1863 with his impudent advocacy of colonization, and whose intrigues have nearly if not wholly lost us the Free Constitution of Maryland. Cannot Mr. Lincoln be vigorous,—any, break law in his own case, when it suits him?—And, judging by such instances as these, which side in this great controversy suits him best?

4. One Hahn has been appointed and acts as Governor of Louisiana by a private, unofficial note of Abraham Lincoln. Another act of wanton and needless usurpation on Lincoln's part. This, however, is only a part of his whole gigantic usurpation in taking to himself the whole matter of reconstruction. The President manipulates into existence sham military Boards in Tennessee, Arkansas, and Louisiana, suspends them State governments, and it is asserted by a leading Republican Senator that they are to be and ought to be permitted to vote in this Presidential election. It is to carry out this unblushing scheme that he vetoed the Congressional bill last July, (there is really no veto under our Constitution, but we use the term for convenience,) a veto which drew forth the only manly act done by the Republicans for a twelvemonth; I mean the protest of Messrs. Wade and Davis.

I call the whole action of the President's usurpation, because reconstruction cannot begin in any State till war ends. Whenever and wherever war ends, all authority to reconstruct rests in Congress; every act of the Executive under the idea of reconstruction is usurpation, wanton, needless, and premeditated danger. If we had statesmen, and not partisans in Congress, the first act of the President of this nature would have been met by impeachment, or full warning of it, unless the step was retraced. I am an Abolitionist, and rejoice in everything which prolongs this war now that its prolongation becomes necessary to the freedom of the negro. But I am also a citizen, and watch vigilantly for the welfare of constitutional Government. If Mr. Lincoln should use such votes, and be elected by them, no citizen would be bound to submit to his election; every lover of constitutional liberty would be bound to resist it in the best way he could.

These certainly are acts of pure despotism, and such as no theory of the war power can justify, and for which no plea of military necessity can be made. I do not recall them now as matter of accusation against the President, so much as to show that he can be energetic, vigorous and decisive where it suits him; and if he is not so in protecting and using the negro, it is only from lack of wish. But in themselves these acts are of grave importance in judging the Administration and the President. You think little of these rights now, shutting your foolish eyes, sealing them with childish confidence in Abraham Lincoln. But suppose McClellan could be elected, and, with Chicago managers behind him, inherit these despotic tools Mr. Lincoln has manufactured—what then? Suppose he should exercise the right, without law, Constitution, or evidence of crime, to kidnap men by their bed chambers, and answer congressional inquiry by telling them he knew it was opposed to law and precedent, but it was his will? Suppose, without consulting the Senate, and without commissions, he should put Vallandigham, Seymour and Wood in Grant's, Sherman's and Sheridan's places—what then? Suppose he should claim exclusive right to reconstruct the South so as to secure his own election, with the aid of some convenient Banks to help him, and veto all bills that interfered with his plan? All these things he could do, and silence criticism by saying he was only following in such steps of his illustrious predecessor as had been silently or expressly approved by the Republican party, and endorsed at Baltimore.

But let us come directly to the Emancipation question, and Mr. Lincoln's general bearing toward the negro, and by a fair examination of his whole record fit ourselves to judge which, at the final settlement, he will yield on, the question of Union or that of the Negro.

First let me say, that though valuing the war chiefly, as I believe the controlling minds of the North do, for this its incidental but inevitable result, (these minds but for which the war would never have been undertaken,) still no one of them ever asked Government to abolish slavery merely because it was sinful. When Mr. Lincoln had got power by swearing to sustain a pro-slavery Constitution, no one ever asked him to do an official act "in mere deference to his abstract judgment and feeling on slavery." We have only called on the Government to touch slavery as a righteous, efficient and necessary means to save the Union. But let us recur to Mr. Lincoln's record.

In his debate with Douglas, in 1858, he would not grant the negro citizenship or suffrage—was opposed to their political or social equality—and believed the two races could never live together. In Congress, he made himself prominent by adding to the power of the infamous Fugitive Slave Bill—extending the area to which it would apply. When he left home to assume the Presidency, his first pledge was to return slaves. During his administration, Congress has been busy and glorious in a dozen anti-slavery measures—admitting negroes to testify in courts—abolishing slavery in the District and Territories—freeing the slaves of rebels and others—acknowledging Liberia and Hayti—attempts to do justice to the colored soldier in the matter of pay—&c. &c. Of originating all these, the merit belongs wholly to Congress. We do not hear of any effort of the President connected with them. He only cooperated, and in some (as confiscation) reluctantly cooperated. Their effort to guarantee his own Proclamation he vetoed. Bear in mind that the North accepted the war mainly, if not wholly, to get at the means of abolishing slavery—that the South rebelled to save it—and that Mr. Lincoln, in his interview, September, 1862, with the Chicago Committee, said, "Slavery is at the root of the rebellion, or at least its sine qua non."

Still, after that long interview between the President and the Border State representatives, in July, 1862, Mr. Horace Maynard, one of those present, thus describes to Mr. Lincoln the impression it made on him:—"Your whole administration gives the highest assurance that you are moved, not so much from a desire to see all men everywhere made free, as from a desire to preserve free institutions for the benefit of men already free; not to make slaves free men, but to prevent free men from being made slaves; not to destroy an institution which a portion of us only consider bad, but to save an institution which we all alike consider good. I am satisfied that you would not ask from any of your fellow-citizens a sacrifice not in your judgment imperatively required by the safety of the country. This is the spirit of your appeal, and I respond to it in the same spirit."

December, 1862, just before his Emancipation Proclamation, Mr. Lincoln says, in a letter to Fernando Wood, that if the South will only submit, a full and general amnesty will be granted; and asks that if Mr. Wood knows anything of a disposition on the part of the South to do so, he will inform him, the President; adding, "such information might be more valuable before the 1st of January than after it." An intimation which confirms all we learn elsewhere of the reluctance with which he consented to issue his proclamation, and his wish that the slaveholding rebels might aid him to avoid it. In his message to Congress, a year after, December, 1863, the President says he had "no more the rebellion could be suppressed without resorting to it (Emancipation) as a military measure."

But he reveals his disposition on this matter most clearly in his letter to Mr. Greeley, August, 1862. He says:—"If there are those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. That is true; nobody ever thought so ill of him. Farther: If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could, at the same time, destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. That is true; nobody ever thought so well of him. He goes on: "My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to save or to destroy slavery." Agreed: very allowable and right for an officer under the Constitution of 1789. He adds: "If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it. Here I differ; and this is the very spot where the Statesman and Abolitionist part company with Mr. Lincoln. That I am not catching at a chance phrase to judge him unfairly, let me remind you that he reiterates the same principle still more emphatically in his letter dated April, 1864. He tells Mr. Hodges that he vetoed Fremont, and then Cameron, and then Hunter, because he thought the hour of indispensable necessity had not come. He adds that he endeavored, in March, May and July, 1862, by earnest appeals to the Border States, to avert that necessity, and when finally driven to Emancipation, he used it doubting whether he should get greater gain or loss from it."

This is a vastly important statement by which to test the President's mood on this question; and on that mood depends largely our future. This word "necessary" has played a large part in our constitutional history. The Constitution gives Congress "power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution" its other powers. Strict constructionists, especially at the South, have contended that this means *indispensably* necessary; Congress can only under this clause, use only such means as it is not possible to do without. On the other hand, the interpretation accepted at the North and by the Supreme Court is, that "necessary" means conducive to, convenient for, requisite, &c. For instance, Congress, under its general power to make war, may use all "necessary" means;—that is, it may build forts for its defence and for convenience for war. Yet war could be and has been made without forts, hence they are not *indispensably* necessary, and if the Southern construction prevailed, Congress could erect no fortifications. So of the use of iron-clads, monitors, and steamships—not indispensable; navies existed hundreds of years without them.

So of the war power. That gives Mr. Lincoln the right to use all means necessary for success. When he looks North, and deals with Northern blood, treasure or rights, he interprets this word "necessary" as covering what to use his own words in his message of March, 1862, "seems indispensable, or may obviously promise great efficiency." But when he looks South toward Southern institutions, it means "absolutely indispensable." Journals and men talk too freely about the Government—suppress the one, and send the other to Fort Warren! Suspend *habeas corpus*, and let Mr. Seward's "little bell" supersede all courts, State and Federal! All right! In these things, Mr. Lincoln only did his duty, and deserves the thanks of all good citizens. But, mark, he does not try for a few months or years whether he could not get along with the ordinary course of law, indictments, juries, judges and State jails. Oh, no; to suspend *habeas corpus* is an efficient and convenient means to sustain the Government, therefore it is necessary in the sense of the Constitution and war power. No need to try whether you could not get along in the old ordinary way. This is a good way and sure, therefore select it at once, and waste no time, treasure or blood in experiments. Agreed. The country says amen,—lays free speech, personal liberty, the blood of sons and the wealth of the nation cheerfully on the altar. Then Mr. President turns toward slavery—Is it the root of the rebellion? asks the Nation. Yes, says the President. Why not at once cut it up and end the rebellion? asks the Nation, which sees the whole Government swallowed up by General McClellan on the one hand, and Seward's "little bell" on the other.

Now, to this demand only three answers are possible. 1st, either Mr. Lincoln believes that slavery has some more sacred constitutional guarantee than free speech and personal liberty have; or, 2nd, he dreads grappling with and offending Southern and slaveholding public opinion more than he does trampling (necessarily) on Northern love of free speech; or, 3d, he

believes that if it be not quite true that "a negro has no rights which a white man is bound to respect," still, a white man's rights and wrongs are to be settled before a negro is attended to. One of the old, in its almost almost two years before the President ventured to touch slavery. Choose which you prefer to explain that long criminal delay. When you have chosen, look and see whether the reason you give does not wholly or largely unite one poisoned by the slave's rights and the North's hang-dogdom? Does not avoid this by saying, "Oh! Mr. Lincoln did better now." That is evasion, and not reply. Know that the negro had been a very poor soldier. Great at any time from the enemy even a poor soldier and a good laborer must be a gain, and while a slave, unless Mr. Lincoln feared that Emancipation would so fire the Southern heart and Northern imagination against us as more than to counterbalance the name—that is only my second reason under another name—what is the South? as it is a slave, it is a slave at Charleston and Chicago, and contempt for the entire party has become showing how strong the Emancipation party has become under his nursing, will only make him more timid and swift. If I dared, I would explain why he has not yet done justice to the negro, in any thing, as I shall show, and now turns the old shoulder to radicalism, why may not that same fear make him sacrifice as next year in making peace? Here, I suspect that man who was wise in making peace in Massachusetts, and only half wise in despoiling the South.

"I would save the Union if I could without freeing a slave?" Suppose he and Fernando Wood, in December, 1862, had patched up a compromise, freeing a slave, and then follow Mr. Lincoln to the effecting of it. "You held the Nation in your hand when slavery rebelled!" "Yes." "You had the right to free every slave." "Yes." "You knew it would be a moral blow at the rebellion?" "Yes." "And yet you hoped and struggled to make peace and avoid this?" "Yes." "Would not history say, 'I need no delicate shades of Christianity to weigh each man's Paganism: hisses from his grave of two thousand years—*Quid non vellet, cum debeat pasci, jactare, lacerare*.' Go, new founder of Slavery!"

No, he will say this is unjust to Mr. Lincoln. The free negroes would not have given us any help. He told Union men to help the slave. He would not hold the ingratiate Negro who believed a man to be a slave, fight because he was black is not a man to settle the terms of peace where the negro is so nearly content. I answer again, the man who knew so little of the North went to war for is not the man to settle the conditions of peace. Ignorance of his own time and contempt for the negro are not just the qualities to stereotype into law what our sons are dying for in Virginia.

Do you say Mr. Lincoln has unlearned contempt for the negro? Let us inquire and see. In July, 1861, at the motion of Loring, the House of Representatives resolved, 95 to 65, that "it is the part of a soldier's duty to return fugitive slaves." A formal Bill was enacted March, 1862. Wickliffe, of Kentucky, said in the House that General Fremont twelve from Fort Donelson, February, 1862; Senator Grimes, in April, '62, charged "those high military officers" with this guilt. Mr. Sumner at that time denounced McCook, Buell, Hooker, and Halleck's infamous order No. 3, banishing all fugitives from their lines. Show me from that day till now among the crowds of offenders one officer whom Mr. Lincoln has ever punished for this infamous offence! Is this the heart, the fair play and sense of justice, that the negro, or the Northerner can trust with the keys to gain which is to issue in peace?

In December, 1861, Congress denounced the horrible brutalities of the District—showing that the President could hardly parallel it. The result had been almost incredible impudence to deny admission to Senators. The North shook with indignation at the barbarous and impudent violation of all law in the treatment of the colored race there. For more than a year, Mr. Lincoln refused to remove the cruel and brutal marshal. I am not sure that he has ever yet done so. In January, 1863, Mr. Lincoln summoned the blacks into the army, the War Department promising them the same treatment as white soldiers. He allows, in his letter to Hodges, that he has there some 300,000 enrolled. Their help he says is indispensable. He never freed them, he says, out of any regard for them; no, only when he could not help it. He confesses he could not now do without them. At any moment since that 1st of January, he might have paid these indispensable allies the same as he paid white soldiers. The best lawyers in the land told him so. The treaties of radicals were met with trifling and vague replies. He never moved. It was the summer of 1864 before he even asked his legal adviser, Mr. Bates, for his opinion. Congress specially authorized him to act on that opinion. Mr. Bates told him the white and black soldiers stand legally on the same level. The President still refused to treat them on the same level of pay. Is this the man to watch their rights in the conferences touching peace?

For Fillmore! Those two words tell the whole and history. In July, 1863, Mr. Lincoln announced that if any black soldier were killed in violation of the laws

Members of the order, who, upon a full
 acquaintance with its principles,

break at the period of her disclosures. "Who, though dead, is before them for the reason that," as the words of the order which I cited at length, "as they are barbarous; so I told them I utterly strove to spare more to do with them." This woman was attested to the command of the rebel *Ferret*, was known by the name of "Lieutenant Rawley," an officer, because she afforded her unusual facility for crossing our lines, was often employed in the execution of important commissions within our territory, and, as a member of the order, was so extensively acquainted with other members, as to be the Northern and Southern sections. Her testimony is very peculiarly valuable, and being a woman of high intelligence and force of character, her statements are succinct, pointed, and emphatic. They are also especially so fully corroborating those of other witnesses regarded as most trustworthy.

6. Officers of the order of high rank, who have been prompted to present confessions, must have detailed in their reports to the order and their names with it. The principal officers are these: *Hunt, Dunn* and *Smith*, grand commanders, deputy grand commanders, and grand secretary of the order in *Missouri*, to whose statements frequent reference has been made. These confessions, though they seem to us free of prejudice and disingenuousness, have furnished to the government such valuable information in regard to the secret operations of the order, especially in *Missouri*, the affiliation of its leaders with the state. It is to be noted that *Dunn* makes the statement in common with other witnesses referred to in the order, he was quite ignorant of its purposes and designs. He says: "I did not become a member of the order, but I was induced to do so in the dark, without reflection, without knowledge."

7. Deserters from our army, who, upon being apprehended, confessed that they had been induced and assisted to desert by members of the order, was, indeed, principally from these confessions. It is the existence of the secret treasonable organization in the State of *Missouri*, was first discovered in *Indiana* in the year 1862.

8. Writers of anonymous communications, addressed to heads of departments or prominent men, disclosing facts corroborative of other more important statements.

The witnesses before the grand jury at *Indianapolis*, *Ind.*, when the order was formally presented as a treasonable conspiracy, and whose testimony has been introduced upon the recent trial of *Dodd*.

It need only be added that a most satisfactory view of the credibility and weight of much of the evidence which has been furnished is afforded by the prime testimony in regard to the character and intentions of the order, which is found in the *Constitution and State of the Order*, and in the *Confessions* of the members, and the various witnesses are but presentations of the logical and inevitable consequences and results of the principles therein set forth.

In concluding this review, it remains only to state that the testimony herein has been made to the honorable official reports of the military and naval

admiral General Carrington, commanding Indian, and of Col. Sanderson, Provost Marshal General of the Department of Missouri. The great mass of the testimony upon the subject of the recent conspiracy have been furnished by these officers, and by the following: Major General H. H. Rosencrans and the Major General, under the instructions of the Secretary of War, Major General Burbridge, commanding District of Kentucky, as well as with Governor Morton, of Indiana, who, though at one time greatly embarrassed, by a Legislature strongly tainted with disloyalty, in his efforts to repress the domestic enemy, has at last seen his State relieved from the danger of a civil war.

But, although the treason of the order has been thoroughly exposed, and although its capacity for fatal mischief has, by means of the arrest of its leaders, the seizure of its arms, and the other vigorous means which have been pursued, been seriously impaired, still it is with its secret plot against the Government, and its designs against the signs in aid of the Southern rebellion. It is reported to have recently issued new signs and passwords, and its members assert that foul means will be used to prevent the success of the Administration at the coming election, and threaten an extended reversion in the event of the re-election of the traitorous President. The presence of the order, and the threat which it is but its echo and faithfully—were not but be amazed at the utter and widespread profligacy, personal and political, which these movements against the Government disclose. The guilty men engaged in them, after casting aside their allegiance, seem to have trodden under foot every maxim of honor and morality, and the laws of man and divine. Julia pronounced but one Julia Lincoln and Rome from the sinks of her demoralization produced but one Catinæ; and yet, as events pass,

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entitled to expect, and will doubtless receive, the same consideration from the zealous co-operation of true men everywhere, in crushing the fraudulent who, emboldened in the haunts of this secret market, should risk in courage and fecklessness the argument which we so easily can sustain our flag on the battle-fields of the South.

Respectfully submitted, J. HOLT,
Judge Adversus Greas.

FARM FOR SALE.

WILL BE SOLD AT PUBLIC AUCTION, on Thursday, the 10th day of November next, some previously disposed of as private sale, the valuable Farm and its appurtenances, situated in WEST AUSTIN, TR. Said farm contains

SEVEN ACRES OF WOODLAND,
very thrifty hard wood, suitable for ship timber, and
acres, or more, of the best of the
CLEARED LAND, with

A TWO-STORY HOUSE, TWO-STORY SHED, AND
a large barn, and other outbuildings.

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